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SIZE MATTERS: FORCE AND SIZE 
DISPARITY IN CASES OF AGGRAVATED 
SEXUAL ABUSE 
Abstract: In 2018, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury’s finding 
that a corrections officer deprived a female inmate of her civil rights through his 
commission of aggravated sexual abuse. Following the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals while splitting with the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, the Third Circuit held that size and coercive power disparities between a 
defendant and a victim do not speak to the force element of the federal aggravat-
ed sexual abuse statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Although the Third Circuit takes a 
balanced approach, its adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is problematic 
because the court ignores the Seventh Circuit’s underlying assumption that force 
must result in bodily injury. Such thinking ignores the legislative intent behind 
the statute and effectively reintroduces the outdated resistance doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
A male prison guard rapes a female inmate in her cell, lying on top of her 
with the full weight of his body so that she cannot get away—has the guard 
used force?1 In 2018, in United States v. Shaw, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals confronted this question when analyzing the amount of force required to 
constitute aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a).2 The district 
court instructed the jury that it could consider disparities in coercive power and 
size between the assailant and the victim when determining whether the assail-
ant used force during the assault.3 On appeal of the jury instruction, the Third 
Circuit split with the Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, hold-
ing that a size disparity does not satisfy the force requirement unless explicitly 
linked to restraint of the victim.4 In so ruling, the Third Circuit adopted the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ reasoning in its decision in 2018 in Cates v. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 444–45, 447–48, 452 (3d Cir. 2018) (examining this 
issue and concluding the guard used force). 
 2 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012). 
 3 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 450. The challenged portion of the instruction reads: “The disparity in coer-
cive power and size between the defendant and [the victim] are factors that the jury may consider 
when determining whether force was utilized.” (emphasis omitted). Id. 
 4 See id. at 451 (finding that the size disparity instruction contained no link to the physical re-
straint required to complete the assault); see also United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding that size disparity may give rise to an inference of force); United States v. 
Webb, 252 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that disparities in size and coercive power be-
tween the victim and defendant are force considerations); Unites States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d  998, 1002 
(5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a size disparity may imply force). 
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United States, in which the Seventh Circuit held that size disparity alone may 
not lead to an inference of force.5 
This Comment argues that, although the Third Circuit’s approach is nec-
essarily cautious, the courts should not look to the Seventh Circuit’s reason-
ing.6 Part I of this Comment discusses the facts and procedural history of the 
Shaw case and provides a brief overview of deprivation of civil rights under 
color of law and the development of the aggravated sexual abuse statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2241(a).7 Part II of this Comment explains how the circuit courts in-
terpret the aggravated sexual abuse statute’s force requirement.8 Part III of this 
Comment argues that courts should not look to the Seventh Circuit for guid-
ance because the Cates decision reintroduces the resistance doctrine that the 
aggravated sexual abuse statute intended to eradicate.9 
I. THE PRISON SEXUAL ASSAULT LEADING TO THE SHAW DECISION  
AND UNDERSTANDING AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE  
AS A DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
This Part contextualizes the Third Circuit’s Shaw decision by explaining 
the circumstances surrounding the prison rape, the defendant’s conviction, and 
efforts to modernize rape law.10 Section A develops the facts of the prison rape 
that led to the Shaw case.11 Section B discusses the procedural history of 
Shaw.12 Section C describes the framework for deprivation of civil rights 
claims and the reform efforts that drove development of the aggravated sexual 
abuse statute.13 
A. The Circumstances of the Assault in Shaw 
In 2010, Appellant Shawn Shaw was a corrections officer at the Essex 
County Correctional Facility (“ECCF”) in Newark, New Jersey.14 Despite 
working at ECCF for over five years, Shaw rarely worked in the women’s 
unit.15 Due to a snowstorm, however, Shaw was covering the unit alone over-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Shaw, 891 F.3d at 451 (adopting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis); see also 
Cates v. United States, 882 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that force cannot be inferred 
from a size disparity alone). 
 6 See infra notes 90–109 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 10–56 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 57–89 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 90–109 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 14–56 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 23–33 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 34–56 and accompanying text. 
 14 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 444. 
 15 Id. at 444–45. 
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night when E.S. was held there awaiting trial.16 At the start of Shaw’s shift, 
E.S. and several other inmates exposed their bare behinds to him as part of a 
hazing ritual for new officers in the unit.17 Shaw proceeded to speak to E.S. in 
a sexually charged manner and threatened to come into her cell.18 
Later, when E.S. was sleeping, Shaw entered her cell.19 He took off her 
pants and placed his hand on her chest, holding her in place so that she could 
not escape when he digitally penetrated her vagina.20 Shaw then laid on top of 
E.S. with the full weight of his body and raped her.21 With Shaw on top of her, 
E.S. was unable to move and felt like she was suffocating.22 
B. Shaw’s Conviction and Appeal 
A federal grand jury indicted Shaw on two counts: (1) deprivation of civil 
rights through aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and (2) obstruc-
tion of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).23 In order to indict Shaw for dep-
rivation of civil rights, the grand jury had to find that Shaw was acting under 
color of law at the time of the assault and intentionally deprived E.S. of her 
constitutional right to be free from bodily violation.24 After an eight-day trial in 
the District Court of New Jersey, the jury convicted Shaw on both counts.25 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Id. The court refers to the victim by her initials throughout the opinion. Id. at 444 n.1. The 
overnight shift ran from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Id. at 445. 
 17 Id. at 445. 
 18 Id. Shaw referred to E.S. as “‘Becky,’ a derogatory term for a white woman who gives oral sex, 
and asked her if she was going to let him ‘hit that,’ which she understood to be a request to engage in 
sexual acts.” Brief for Appellee at 2, United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441 (No 16-2860). 
 19 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 445. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. E.S., who was five-feet-five-inches and 130 pounds, testified that Shaw was over six feet 
tall and “far heavier” than she. Id. at 445 n.3. 
 22 Id. Initially, E.S. only told her mother, attorney, and a fellow male prisoner of the rape. Id. 
Once the male prisoner informed jail officials, E.S. made a formal report. Id. A Sexual Assault Nurse 
Examiner found semen inside of her that was subsequently linked to Shaw. Id. 
 23 Indictment at 1–3, United States v. Shaw, No. 2:13-cr-00660 (D.N.J. June 15, 2016). Shaw was 
charged with obstruction of justice for making misleading statements to ECCF investigators and an 
Essex County prosecutor. Id. at 2. 
 24 Id. at 1. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution encompasses the right to 
bodily integrity. See Johanna R. Shargel, Essay, United States v. Lanier: Securing the Freedom to 
Choose, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1997) (noting that the right to bodily integrity is based on the 
“liberty interest” of the Due Process Clause) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.”). 
 25 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 446; see Docket, United States v. Shaw, No. 2:13-cr-00660 (D.N.J. June 15, 
2016) (listing eight days of trial transcripts). Shaw was sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment: 
twenty-five years for deprivation of civil rights and twenty years for obstruction of justice. Judgment 
in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Shaw, No. 2:13-cr-00660 (D.N.J. June 15, 2016). 
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Although the jury returned a guilty verdict for deprivation of civil rights 
through aggravated sexual assault, it found no bodily injury to E.S.26 
Shaw appealed the deprivation of civil rights conviction, challenging the 
propriety of the jury instructions.27 Specifically, Shaw argued that the similari-
ty of the instructions for aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1) 
and the lesser offense of sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1) confused the 
jury.28 The Third Circuit agreed, finding that the reference to disparities in size 
and coercive power in both instructions blurred the difference between the 
crimes.29 As a result, the jury could have confused coerced consent with the 
use of force.30 
In reviewing challenged jury instructions, the court must consider the in-
structions in their entirety.31 Despite finding the challenged portion of the in-
struction erroneous, the court upheld the verdict because the instructions com-
municated to the jury that it could only find Shaw guilty of aggravated sexual 
abuse if he used actual force.32 Shaw made no further appeal of the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision.33 
C. Understanding Shaw’s Crime 
The jury convicted Shaw of deprivation of rights under color of law, a 
federal civil rights statute.34 The crime occurs when an individual acting with 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 446 n.7. In contrast, the grand jury did find bodily injury. Indictment, supra 
note 23, at 1. 
 27 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 446. Shaw also argued that the district court erred in accepting the jury’s 
finding of force based on the sufficiency of evidence presented, wrongfully permitted E.S. to testify 
about her psychotherapy, abused its discretion by admitting lay, rather than expert testimony, to re-
solve a key issue, and failed in its obligation to provide Shaw with a speedy trial. Brief and Appendix 
for Defendant Appellant at 2–3, Shaw, 891 F.3d 441 (No. 16-2860). The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected each of these arguments. Shaw, 891 F.3d at 452–55. 
 28 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 450. An individual commits the lesser crime of sexual abuse when he or she 
“knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person 
in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected 
to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping).” 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1). The parenthetical phrase distin-
guishes sexual abuse from its aggravated form. Shaw, 891 F.3d at 448 (citing Cates, 882 F.3d at 736). 
 29 Shaw, 891 F.3d. at 450. Like the aggravated sexual abuse instruction, the sexual abuse instruc-
tion listed disparities in size and coercive powers as factors for the jury to consider as to whether the 
sexual contact was unwanted. Id. 
 30 Id. at 451. 
 31 Id. at 450. The court exercises plenary review in these instances. Id. at 459. 
 32 Id. at 452. The aggravated sexual abuse instruction required the jury to find that force was used 
against the person, that force was used in the course of the assault, and that the statute contains a force 
requirement. Id. 
 33 See Docket, Shaw, 891 F.3d 441 (No. 16-2860) (omitting further appeal). 
 34 See Shaw, 891 F.3d at 446 (citing Shaw’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242); see also United 
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264 (1997) (describing 18 U.S.C. § 242 as a Reconstruction Era civil 
rights statute). 
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state authority deprives a person of his or her constitutional protections.35 The 
statute sets out three tiers of offenses and the statutory maximum penalty for 
each.36 The primary offense in each tier is the deprivation of rights under color 
of law; however, a first tier offense, with an accompanying sentence of one 
year, does not involve the use of weapons, threats, or force.37 In the second 
tier, the prescribed maximum penalty increases from one year to ten years if 
bodily injury results from the conduct or the conduct includes the use of a dan-
gerous weapon, explosives, or fire.38 Aggravated sexual abuse falls into the 
third tier and carries a potential life sentence.39 The statute encompasses sexual 
assault because sexual assault violates the victim’s constitutional right to bodi-
ly integrity under the Due Process Clause.40 
Section 242 does not define aggravated sexual abuse, so courts have de-
fined the term by reference to the federal aggravated sexual abuse statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2241.41 Section 2241(a) defines aggravated sexual abuse as intention-
ally causing a person to engage in unwanted sex by either (1) using force 
against the victim or (2) scaring the victim into believing that another person 
will face death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping.42 The district court 
charged Shaw under the first definition.43 
                                                                                                                           
 35 18 U.S.C. § 242; see also Shargel, supra note 24, at 1115 n.3 (providing the definition of con-
duct committed under color of law). The statute encompasses constitutional law by reference rather 
than by describing all prohibited conduct. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265. As a result, the statute is unique in 
its applicability to a broad array of conduct. Shaw, 891 F.3d at 447 (citing Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81, 101 (1996)). 
 36 18 U.S.C. § 242. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. The third tier also includes conduct that results in death, kidnapping or attempted kidnap-
ping, attempted aggravated sexual abuse, and attempts to kill. Id. In addition to life in prison, an indi-
vidual may also be subject to the death penalty (notwithstanding other constitutional provisions). Id.; 
see also Shaw, 891 F.3d at 447 n.9 (noting that Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), prohibits 
the death penalty for child rape where death does not result). 
 40 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”); Shargel, supra note 24, at 1118 (citing various 
authorities that have adopted this theory). Somewhat curiously, the United States Supreme Court has 
not addressed whether sexual assault is a constitutional violation. Id. at 1117. 
 41 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 447 (citing Cates, 882 F.3d at 736; United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873, 
888 (6th Cir. 2010); Holly, 488 F.3d at 1301; United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1120 (5th 
Cir. 2006)). 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). In 2017, in United States v. Holly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that § 2241(a)(2) was satisfied where the victim testified that the defendant said, “[I]f he can’t get 
to me, he’ll get to my family, and my little sister is cute too. He goes, ‘Your little sister is awfully cute 
too.’ And my little sister is nine years old.” Holly, 488 F.3d at 1309. 
 43 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 450. 
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Section 2241 is often analyzed in conjunction with § 2242, which sets out 
the lesser offense of sexual abuse.44 Section 2242 encompasses unwanted sex-
ual contact that results from coercive behavior other than force or the height-
ened form of fear described under § 2241(a)(2).45 Congress added both sec-
tions to the U.S. Code as part of the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986.46 The legisla-
tion sought to modernize and reform federal rape statutes by shifting the focus 
of criminal inquiries from the conduct of the victim to that of the assailant.47 
The resulting changes eliminated the relevance of the victim’s physical re-
sistance and lack of consent in proving aggravated sexual abuse.48 
This change marked a shift from the common law approach to sexual as-
sault and rape.49 The common law defined rape in relation to the woman’s re-
sistance and the rapist’s use of force.50 Women were expected to offer their 
“utmost resistance” to assault.51 Thus, the resistance and force elements 
worked together because the amount of force the assailant had to use deter-
mined whether the victim offered her utmost resistance.52 The utmost re-
sistance requirement was difficult to meet, and as a result, rape was often im-
possible to prove.53 
Starting in the late 1970s, however, reformers began arguing that it is 
dangerous for women to resist their attackers.54 In adopting § 2241, Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See, e.g., id. at 447–48 (“We read the aggravated sexual abuse statute . . . in contrast to the 
statute defining the lesser crime of (non-aggravated) sexual abuse.”); Cates, 882 F.3d 736–37 (analyz-
ing § 2241 in contrast to § 2242); Holly, 488 F.3d at 1303 (distinguishing § 2241 from § 2242). 
 45 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 448. 
 46 H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 14–16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6194–96. 
 47 Id. at 10. The act also redefined the crimes in a gender-neutral manner, broadened the offenses 
to capture more abusive conduct, rejected the doctrine of spousal immunity, and increased the range 
of federal jurisdiction to include all federal prisons. Id. at 10–11. 
 48 Id. at 13. The statutory definitions are meant to encompass all of the elements a prosecutor 
must prove—non-consent and resistance are deliberately excluded. Id. Despite these reform efforts, 
only seven of every 1,000 rapes will result in a conviction. RAPE ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK 
(RAINN), The Criminal Justice System: Statistics (2018), https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-
justice-system [https://perma.cc/G44U-XCVT]. 
 49 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 11 (describing the common law definition of rape). 
 50 Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962. Defin-
ing rape as requiring resistance and force separated the crime from sex outside of marriage, which was 
criminalized up until 1965. Kari Hong, A New Mens Rea for Rape: More Convictions and Less Pun-
ishment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259, 279 (2018). Rape was considered a violation of modesty and the 
dignity of marriage, not of personal autonomy. Id. 
 51 Anderson, supra note 50, at 962. 
 52 H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 11. 
 53 Anderson, supra note 50, at 963–64. In a 1906 case, the victim testified, “I tried as hard as I 
could to get away. I was trying all the time to get away as hard as I could.” Id. at 963. She added, “I 
was trying to get up; I pulled at the grass; I screamed as hard as I could, and he told me to shut up, and 
I didn’t, and then he held his hand on my mouth until I was almost strangled.” Id. The court over-
turned the rape conviction because the victim had “not adequately resisted” the attack. Id. at 964. 
 54 See id. at 968–69 (discussing efforts by legal scholars and reformers to abolish the resistance 
requirement). 
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espoused the reformers arguments, noting the unfairness and danger of requir-
ing sexual assault victims to resist their attackers.55 Accordingly, the legislature 
conceptualized force broadly to include the force required to restrain the vic-
tim.56 
II. INTERPRETING THE FORCE REQUIREMENT: CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE 
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE DISPARITY AND THE USE OF FORCE 
Although the circuit courts all look to § 2241 for the definition of aggra-
vated sexual abuse, they differ as to whether size disparity alone permits an 
inference of force.57 Section A discusses the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals’ expansive interpretation of size disparity as force.58 Section 
B discusses the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ restrictive approach inter-
preting force as entirely physical.59 Section C discusses the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals’ interpretation of size disparity creating an inference of force when 
linked to restraint of the victim.60 
A. Size Disparity as Force: The Expansive Interpretation  
of the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits 
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that size disparity alone 
may create an inference of force.61 In 1998, in United States v. Lucas, the Fifth 
Circuit held that an assailant uses force when the victim is restrained from es-
caping sexual contact.62 Thus, the court held that an assailant used force where 
the assailant pushed the victim into a table and blocked the door.63 Likewise, in 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 11 (“Requiring a victim to become a martyr by testing the sin-
cerity of an offender’s threat is unfair and should not be imposed upon victims of sexual abuse offens-
es.”). 
 56 Id. at 14 n.54a. There are three ways the force requirement can be met: (1) using or threatening 
to use a weapon; (2) using physical force to overpower, restrain, or injure; or (3) using threats to com-
pel or coerce submission. Id. In Shaw, the Third Circuit rejected the third manner of defining force as 
inconsistent with the statutory text. Shaw, 891 F.3d at 449. 
 57 Compare Cates v. United States, 882 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “mere” size 
disparity confuses the distinction between force and fear), with United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 
1302 (10th Cir. 2007) (allowing size disparity to imply force). 
 58 See infra notes 61–72 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 80–89 and accompanying text. 
 61 Holly, 488 F.3d at 1302 (permitting an inference of force from a size disparity between victim 
and assailant); United States v. Webb, 252 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that disparities in 
size and coercive power between victim and defendant are force considerations); United States v. 
Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding size disparity may imply force). 
 62 Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002. 
 63 Id. at 1002 n.9. The court also noted that the disparity in coercive power between the assailant 
and the victim (prison warden versus an inmate), combined with the restraint satisfied the force re-
quirement. Id. at 1002. 
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2006, in United States v. Simmons, the court held that the assailant used force 
when he trapped the victim between himself and his police cruiser.64 Although 
neither case actually discussed size disparities between the defendants and vic-
tims, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless held that such disparities are relevant to the 
force inquiry.65 
Similarly, in 2007, in United States v. Holly, the Tenth Circuit held that 
aggravated sexual abuse does not require violent force.66 Rather, force is estab-
lished by restraint sufficient to prevent the victim from escaping, and may be 
implied by a size disparity.67 The assailant argued that the disparity instruction 
led to a directed verdict against him, but the Tenth Circuit held that such an 
instruction merely gives rise to an inference of force when force cannot be 
proven directly.68 
Like the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit also considers size 
disparity as part of the force inquiry.69 In 2001, in United States v. Webb, the 
Eighth Circuit remanded a case because the district court refused to find force 
despite a 220-pound difference between the victim and the assailant.70 In addi-
tion to lying on top of the victim with his 370-pound body, the assailant locked 
the door to his office, indicated he would only help her if she submitted to his 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding the victim’s testi-
mony that the assailant forced her to perform oral sex on him by putting pressure on her neck and 
prevented her from escaping anal and vaginal penetration by pinning her against his police car is suf-
ficient to support a finding of aggravated sexual abuse). 
 65 See id. (omitting discussion of size disparity between assailant and victim but finding it rele-
vant to force consideration); see also Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002 (finding force may be implied from a 
size disparity, but not discussing specific facts). 
 66 Holly, 488 F.3d at 1302 (“[F]orce within the meaning of aggravated sexual abuse does not 
require ‘the brute force [commonly] associated with rape.” (citing United States v. Reyes Pena, 216 
F.3d 1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 67 Id. The assailant in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in 2007, in United States v. 
Holly, was convicted of five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for aggravated sexual abuse. Id. at 1300. 
He raped four inmates at the jail where he worked and attempted to have sex with another who fought 
him off. Id. Each victim testified that the she was scared at the time of the assaults, but only one vic-
tim referenced any specific threat made by the assailant. Id. The court only upheld the conviction as to 
the victim who was specifically threatened. Id. at 1309–11. 
 68 Id. at 1303. 
 69 Webb, 252 F.3d at 1009. The assailant, Ronald Webb, was the Sheriff of Independent County, 
Arkansas. Id. at 1007. The victim visited his office to obtain protection from her abusive husband, 
who she was concerned was receiving favorable treatment from the sheriff’s office despite violating a 
restraining order. Id. 
 70 Id. at 1007–10. The case was before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for a second time 
following a government appeal. Id. at 1007. During the first appeal, the government argued that the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas improperly interpreted force as requiring violence. 
Id. at 1008. The Eighth Circuit remanded the case and instructed the district court to consider the size 
disparity between the defendant and the victim as part of the force analysis. Id. On remand, the district 
court again found that the assailant did not use force. Id. at 1009. At the resentencing hearing, the 
district court judge stated, “I mean, [the assault] ain’t the crime of the century; it ain’t even a felony.” 
Id. at 1010 n.5. 
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advances, and placed her hand on his penis.71 The Eighth Circuit held that 
these factors rendered the district court’s failure to find force clearly errone-
ous.72 
B. Size Disparity as Fear: The Narrow Interpretation of the Seventh Circuit 
In contrast to the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit 
conceptualizes force as physical power employed to overcome resistance.73 
Accordingly, force cannot be inferred from size disparity alone because allow-
ing such an inference conflates force with fear.74 Generalized fear may consti-
tute psychological coercion, but it does not constitute force or the level of fear 
required to support a conviction under § 2241(a)(2).75 
In 2018, in Cates v. United States, this narrow interpretation of force led 
the Seventh Circuit to overturn the assailant’s conviction for aggravated sexual 
abuse despite evidence that supported a finding of physical force.76 The court 
concluded that it was unlikely that the jury believed the assailant used force 
where it found that he did not cause bodily injury.77 The court further reasoned 
that although the size disparity between the assailant and the victim may have 
made her fearful, there was no proof that she feared death or serious bodily 
injury.78 Therefore, the jury improperly convicted the defendant based on 
something less than either force or fear of death or serious bodily injury.79 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 1010. 
 72 Id. The court held that the assailant’s actions constituted both physical and psychological re-
straint. Id. 
 73 See Cates, 882 F.3d at 737 (explaining force as “the exertion of physical power upon another to 
overcome that individual’s will to resist.” (citing United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 544 (7th Cir. 
1995))). The Cates appeal stemmed from a petition for collateral relief after the trial judge failed to 
find ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 733. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that coun-
sel’s failure to challenge the aggravated sexual abuse jury instruction constituted prejudicial error. Id. 
 74 Id. at 737. In addition to rejecting the disparity instruction, the court objected to the following 
language: “The requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of . . . the use of threat of harm 
sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim.” Id. This language comes directly from the 
definition of force provided by the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986. H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 14 n.54a. 
 75 Cates, 882 F.3d at 737; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(2) (2012) (stating that threatening or 
placing a person in fear that they will be subject to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping consti-
tutes aggravated sexual abuse). The Seventh Circuit read § 2241(a)(2) as requiring a “specific kind of 
threat.” Cates, 882 F.3d at 737. 
 76 Cates, 882 F.3d at 738. The victim testified that the assailant held her by the neck, pushed her 
against the sink, and raped her. Id. at 734. The nurse who subsequently examined the victim found 
signs—such as bloodshot eyes, pain and swelling in her neck, and previous vomiting—that showed 
she had been choked. Id. The victim testified that she did not resist the assailant, a police officer, be-
cause he was bigger and stronger than she was. Id. 
 77 Id. at 738; see also id. at 735 (noting that the jury found Cates guilty of committing aggravated 
sexual abuse but found he did not cause bodily injury). 
 78 Id. at 738. The court determined that the jury did not believe the victim to be in fear of death 
because jurors acquitted the assailant on a related firearm charge. Id. 
 79 Id. at 737. 
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C. Size Disparity and Restraint: The Third Circuit’s  
Attempt to Straddle the Line 
Like the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the Third Circuit finds § 2241’s 
force requirement satisfied where an assailant uses physical force to restrain 
the victim.80 The Third Circuit differs, however, in that it considers size dispar-
ity only in the context of physical restraint.81 Permitting the jury to consider 
size disparity without an explicit connection to restraint blurs the distinction 
between sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse.82 
The idea of force as physical restraint of the victim guided the court’s 
analysis.83 In adopting this definition, the court explicitly rejected the idea that 
coercive threats meet the force requirement.84 The court reasoned that unless 
the size disparity is considered in the context of restraint, it acts as a form of 
coercion rather than a manifestation of physical force.85 Accordingly, the court 
rejected the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit in Holly and adopted the Sev-
enth Circuit’s analysis in Cates.86 
Ultimately, however, the court held that Shaw did use force to restrain 
E.S.87 The court cited E.S.’s testimony that Shaw held her down by placing a 
hand on her chest and lying on top of her.88 Although there was no evidence of 
bodily injury to E.S., the court concluded that her testimony was sufficient to 
sustain the conviction.89 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 444–45, 447–48, 452 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-594, at 14 n.54a) (finding force where physical force is used to overcome, restrain, or injure 
the victim); see also Holly, 488 F.3d at 1302 (holding force enhancement appropriate where victim 
was restrained from escaping); Webb, 252 F.3d at 1008 (holding force does not require violence but 
restraint sufficient to prevent the victim’s escape); Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002 (discussing force as re-
straint used to prevent escape). 
 81 Shaw, 891 F.3d at 451 (finding no link between the disparities instruction and restraint). 
 82 Id. According to the court, this conflation of the two crimes vitiates Congress’s graded ap-
proach to sexual assault. Id. at 451–52, 458 (analyzing § 2241 in comparison with § 2242). 
 83 Id. at 449. The government also advocated for this definition of force. Id. When asked at oral 
argument whether size disparities without restraint would constitute force, a government attorney 
admitted, “I don’t know that there would be force, unless the victim is testing that she is physically 
unable to escape the sexual contact.” Id. at 451 n.14. 
 84 Id. at 449. The court cited the “carve out” language of § 2242, which distinguishes coercive 
threats from threats under § 2241. Id. at 448 (citing Cates, 882 F.3d at 736). 
 85 Id. at 450–51. 
 86 Id. at 451 (rejecting Holly because there was no link between size disparity and physical re-
straint and adopting Cates). 
 87 Id. at 453 (rejecting Shaw’s contention that the evidence did not support use of force). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 446 n.7, 453. 
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III. RESISTANCE REVIVED: THE RESULT OF REQUIRING  
INJURY TO PROVE FORCE 
Given the marked distinction in sentencing between the crimes of sexual 
abuse and aggravated sexual abuse, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ cau-
tious approach to the force requirement is warranted.90 Unfortunately, the 
court’s careful analysis is undercut by its reliance on Cates.91 In 2018, in Cates 
v. United States, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that because 
the jury did not find bodily injury, it was unlikely that jurors believed the as-
sailant used physical force.92 Yet nothing in § 2241 or its legislative history 
suggests that physical force must result in bodily injury.93 In fact, preventing 
victim injury is one reason Congress abolished the resistance doctrine when it 
enacted § 2241.94 
Despite formal abolition of the resistance doctrine, courts continue to 
evaluate sexual assault with victim resistance in mind.95 The Cates decision is 
a prime example.96 In addition to concluding that force was not used because 
there was no bodily injury, the Seventh Circuit also pointed to the victim’s lack 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (providing one-year maximum sentence for first tier offense and 
potential life in prison for third tier offenses, including aggravated sexual abuse); United States v. 
Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 452 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding jury instruction adequately conveyed that aggravated 
sexual abuse requires actual force); Cates v. United States, 882 F.3d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting 
aggravated sexual assault “dramatically increase[s]” the sentence under § 242). 
 91 See Shaw, 891 F.3d at 451 (citing positively to Cates while ignoring outdated assumptions in 
its reasoning). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in its 2018 decision in Cates v. United States, 
dismissed the victim’s testimony that she did not resist her assailant because he was much larger than 
her and a police officer as “clearly insufficient” to support a finding of force.  882 F.3d at 738. More-
over, the court also believed that because the jury did not find physical injury, it must not have be-
lieved the assailant used force. Id. The court reached this conclusion despite evidence suggesting that 
the victim had been choked. See id. at 734 (noting that a nurse who examined the victim found 
signs—such as bloodshot eyes, a painful and swollen neck, and recent vomiting—consistent with 
choking). 
 92 Cates, 882 F.3d at 738. 
 93 See 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (omitting reference to bodily injury); H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 8 (noting 
that, “[t]o the extent [force] requires physical violence against the person of the victim, it [is] incon-
sistent with the policy behind the rape offense—protecting women from sexual intercourse through 
imposition”). 
 94 H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 11 (describing the resistance doctrine as being “in direct conflict with 
the safety and welfare of sexual abuse victims”). The assumption that resistance causes injury is not 
necessarily true. Anderson, supra note 50, at 981. Furthermore, studies have shown that women who 
fight back against their attackers are generally more successful in averting rape. Id. at 982–83. 
 95 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986) (noting that statutory definitions of 
force and consent may require a woman to show reasonable resistance as matters of practical and legal 
necessity); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV. 205, 213–14 
(2017) (describing courts’ and juries’ continued adherence to traditional understandings of rape and 
resistance). 
 96 See Cates, 882 F.3d at 738 (finding it unlikely that the jury believed the assailant used force 
where jurors found no bodily injury). 
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of resistance.97 The court gave no weight to her testimony that she did not re-
sist because of the defendant’s strength and size.98 And, the court also ignored 
the victim’s testimony that she felt could not resist because the assailant was a 
police officer.99 
As a result, Cates subverts Congress’s intent to abolish the resistance doc-
trine and divorces the facts of sexual assault from physical and psychological 
realities.100 In many instances of sexual assault, no physical force is required to 
restrain the victim.101 In these cases, where no brute force or specific threats 
are made, a Seventh Circuit analysis fails to recognize or protect the victim’s 
right to bodily integrity.102 
Moreover, aggravated sexual abuse cases under 18 U.S.C. § 242 often in-
volve stark disparities in power between the victim and assailant.103 The assail-
ant already commands control over the victim, thus needing less force to re-
strain her, especially if there is also a size disparity.104 As Susan Estrich notes 
in her article, Rape, sometimes force is the power that the assailant does not 
need to use.105 
Accordingly, the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals’ ex-
pansive approach to force best captures the social harm of aggravated sexual 
abuse under color of law.106 Contrary to the Third Circuit’s view that such an 
approach blurs the distinction between aggravated sexual abuse and sexual 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. 
 98 See id. (stating victim’s testimony that she did not resist “clearly insufficient” to support a 
finding of force or fear of death or serious bodily injury). 
 99 See id. at 734 (citing victim’s testimony that it is not a “smart idea” to fight with the police, 
particularly an officer with a weapon). 
 100 See id. at 738 (dismissing the victim’s testimony that she did not resist her assailant because 
he was much larger than her and a police officer as “clearly insufficient” to support a finding of ag-
gravated sexual abuse); H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 11 (describing resistance doctrine as unfair and 
unnecessary); Anderson, supra note 50, at 1003 (“[I]n many instances, a man who intends to rape 
does not have to use any physical force to subdue the victim.”). 
 101 Anderson, supra note 50, at 1003 (citing study of 115 sex offenders, most of whom used psy-
chological force rather than physical force in the assault of 530 victims). 
 102 See Estrich, supra note 95, at 1106 (arguing courts have difficulty finding force where there is 
a time gap between force and the assault and where the force is merely “incidental” to the rape). 
 103 See Shaw, 891 F.3d at 444–45 (assault of inmate by prison guard); Cates, 882 F.3d at 732 
(assault of crime victim by police officer); United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 1300 (10th Cir. 
2007) (assault of inmates by county sheriff); United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (assault of teenager by police officer); United States v. Webb, 252 F.3d 1006, 1007 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (assault of domestic violence victim by county sheriff). 
 104 See United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding power disparity be-
tween jail warden and inmate, plus physical restraint as satisfying the force element). Size disparity 
was not at issue in the case—the victim was restrained by virtue of defendant pressing her against a 
table and blocking her means of escape. Id. 
 105 Estrich, supra note 95, at 1115. 
 106 See Holly, 488 F.3d at 1302 (permitting force inference from size disparity); Webb, 252 F.3d 
at 1009 (holding that differences in size and coercive power between victim and assailant are force 
considerations); Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002 (holding size disparity may imply force). 
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abuse, case law suggests that the distinction remains.107 For instance, in 2007, 
in United States v. Holly, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded four convic-
tions for aggravated sexual abuse because the record demonstrated neither the 
requisite level of force nor fear.108 The court reached this determination despite 
permitting an inference of force from disparities in size or coercive power.109 
Accordingly, employing a broader understanding of force will maintain the 
distinction between the crimes and punish more problematic conduct.110 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ call to link size disparity to 
the issue of restraint is logical, its failure to examine or at least acknowledge 
flaws in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis is problematic. The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach to force is unnecessarily restrictive and suggests 
that the victim must resist her attacker. Such a requirement contradicts the leg-
islative intent behind the statute and places an undue burden on victims of sex-
ual abuse. As such, the expansive approach to force adopted by the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals is best suited to capturing the most 
instances of sexual abuse. 
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 107 See, e.g., Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002 (finding aggravated sexual abuse because of the use of re-
straint combined with coercive power disparity). 
 108 Holly, 488 F.3d at 1310–11. Although the court held that three of the victims were afraid, in 
part because the sheriff’s gun was in reach during the assault, fear was not their only motivation. Id. at 
1310. The other victim did not mention her fear until the prosecutor specifically questioned her. Id. 
The judge instructed the jury that the fear requirement could be met by fear of “some bodily harm,” 
rather than an explicit fear or death or seriously bodily injury. Id. at 1303. 
 109 Id. at 1302. The jury instruction read, “The requirement of force may be satisfied by a show-
ing of restraint sufficient to prevent the victim from escaping the sexual conduct. Force may also be 
implied from a disparity in coercive power or size . . . .” Id. at 1301. Given that the assailant was a 
sheriff and the victims were female inmates in his custody, a power disparity certainly existed. See id. 
at 1300 (discussing the assailant’s position as sheriff). 
 110 See id. at 1309–11 (analyzing conduct that supports a charge of aggravated sexual abuse and 
conduct that does not). 
